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**PINNOCK & WAKEFIELD**

A Professional Corporation  
Theodore A. Pinnock, Esq. Bar #: 153434  
David C. Wakefield, Esq. Bar #: 185736  
Michelle L. Wakefield, Esq. Bar #: 200424  
3033 Fifth Avenue, Suite 410  
San Diego, CA 92103  
Telephone: 619.858.3671  
Facsimile: 619.858.3646

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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CLERK US DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BY Rm DEPUTY

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

**TRIPPLE AAA ASSOCIATION FOR  
CHILDREN WITH  
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES**

**Plaintiffs,**

**v.**

**THE SCREEN MACHINE, INC.;  
RONALD L. HALL; And DOES 1  
THROUGH 10, Inclusive**

**Defendants.**

Case No. **06CV 2588** **DMS CAB**

**CLASS ACTION**

**CIVIL COMPLAINT:**  
**DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES IN**  
**PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS**  
**[42 U.S.C. 12182(a) ET. SEQ; CIVIL**  
**CODE 51, 52, 54, 54.1]**

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**  
**[F.R.Civ.P. rule 38(b)]**

**INTRODUCTION**

Plaintiffs herein complain, by filing this Civil Complaint in accordance with rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the Judicial District of the United States District Court of the Southern District of California, that Defendants have in the past, and presently are, engaging in discriminatory practices against individuals with disabilities, specifically including minorities with disabilities. Plaintiffs allege this civil action and others substantial similar thereto are necessary to compel access compliance because empirical research on the effectiveness of Title III of the

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1 Americans with Disabilities Act indicates this Title has failed to achieve full and equal access  
2 simply by the executive branch of the Federal Government funding and promoting voluntary  
3 compliance efforts. Further, empirical research shows when individuals with disabilities give  
4 actual notice of potential access problems to places of public accommodation without a federal  
5 civil rights action, the public accommodations do not remove the access barriers. Therefore,  
6 Plaintiffs make the following allegations in this federal civil rights action:

7  
8 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

9 1. The federal jurisdiction of this action is based on the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42  
10 United States Code 12101-12102, 12181-12183 and 12201, et seq. Venue in the Judicial District  
11 of the United States District Court of the Southern District of California is in accordance with 28  
12 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of Plaintiffs' claims arose within the Judicial District of  
13 the United States District Court of the Southern District of California.

14 **SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION**

15 2. The Judicial District of the United States District Court of the Southern District of  
16 California has supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims as alleged in this Complaint pursuant  
17 to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The reason supplemental jurisdiction is proper in this action is because all  
18 the causes of action or claims derived from federal law and those arising under state law, as herein  
19 alleged, arose from common nucleus of operative facts. The common nucleus of operative facts,  
20 include, but are not limited to, the incidents where Plaintiffs were denied full and equal access to  
21 Defendants' facilities, goods, and/or services in violation of both federal and state laws when they  
22 attempted to enter, use, and/or exit Defendants' facilities as described below within this Complaint.

23 Further, due to this denial of full and equal access, TRIPPLE AAA ASSOCIATION FOR  
24 CHILDREN WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES and other persons with disabilities were  
25 injured. Based upon the said allegations, the state actions, as stated herein, are so related to the  
26 federal actions that they form part of the same case or controversy and the actions would ordinarily  
27 be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding.

28 **NAMED DEFENDANTS AND NAMED PLAINTIFF**

1 3. Defendants are, and, at all times mentioned herein, were, a business or corporation or  
2 franchise organized and existing and/or doing business under the laws of the State of California.  
3 Plaintiffs are further informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendant RONALD L. HALL is  
4 the owner, operator, and/or lessor of the real property As to Defendants and the property the public  
5 record reveals:

6 Buyer: RONALD L. HALL

7 Buyer Mailing Address: 1111 W. Olive, San Diego, CA 92103

8 Property Address: 3855 Wabash Avenue, San Diego, CA 92104

9 Assessor's Parcel Number: 447-451-03

10 DBA Name: THE SCREEN MACHINE

11 Business Address: 3855 Wabash Avenue, San Diego, CA 92104

12 4. The words "Plaintiffs" and "Plaintiff's Member" as used herein specifically include the  
13 organization and TRIPPLE AAA ASSOCIATION FOR CHILDREN WITH DEVELOPMENTAL  
14 DISABILITIES and persons associated with its Members who accompanied Members to  
15 Defendants' facilities. Defendants Does 1 through 10, were at all times relevant herein  
16 subsidiaries, employers, employees, agents, of HAPPY DAZE LIQUOR; KASHAT, INC.; and  
17 3392 University Avenue, San Diego, CA 92104. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and  
18 capacities of Defendants sued herein as Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues these  
19 Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will pray leave of the court to amend this complaint  
20 to allege the true names and capacities of the Does when ascertained.

21 5. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that Defendants and each of them  
22 herein were, at all times relevant to the action, the owner, lessor, lessee, franchiser, franchisee,  
23 general partner, limited partner, agent, employee, representing partner, or joint venturer of the  
24 remaining Defendants and were acting within the course and scope of that relationship. Plaintiffs  
25 are further informed and believe, and thereon allege, that each of the Defendants herein gave  
26 consent to, ratified, and/or authorized the acts alleged herein to each of the remaining Defendants.  
27  
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1  
2 **STATEWIDE CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS UNDER FED.R.CIV.P. 23(b) AS TO ALL**  
3 **DEFENDANTS**

4 6. Plaintiffs are members of a group within the State of California composed of persons with a  
5 wide range of disabilities, limited to persons who use wheelchairs for mobility, who must be able to  
6 access retail merchandise establishments, like Defendants' establishments located within the  
7 facility in which THE SCREEN MACHINE is located. Plaintiffs are precluded from equal access  
8 to Defendants' establishments so meaningfully because the establishments, and each of them, fail  
9 to provide access for members of the disability community who use a wheelchair for mobility to  
10 disabled parking facilities, exterior path of travel facilities, entrance facilities, interior path of travel  
11 facilities, and display facilities. The Supreme Court of the United States has held as long as the  
12 class representative provides adequate representation for the class' interests, the court has the  
13 power to adjudicate the rights and obligations of all class members – even those who would  
14 otherwise be beyond the reach of its personal jurisdiction. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 US  
15 797 (1985). This case stands for the proposition that minimum contacts are not required with  
16 nonresident members of a plaintiff class because, “the burdens placed by a State upon absent class  
17 action plaintiff are not of the same order or magnitude as those it places on an absent defendant.”  
18 Id. Plaintiffs allege they will insure class members shall receive adequate notice of the proceedings  
19 and the opportunity to “opt out,” if required. Defendants have conducted themselves such as to  
20 establish a pattern and practice of architectural discrimination. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants  
21 have control over each and every facility, establishment, and/or business located within the  
22 Defendant Landlords' facilities in which Defendant THE SCREEN MACHINE is located.  
23 Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege Defendants are responsible for removing architectural barriers at  
24 Defendants' facilities and the establishment/business contained therein. For the aforementioned  
25 reasons, Plaintiffs allege they are proper class representatives for members of the disability  
26 community who use a wheelchair for mobility because the members of the disability community  
27 who use a wheelchair for mobility are so numerous that joinder is impracticable due to the fact  
28 more than one hundred (100) persons fall within the membership description. Also, the questions of  
law or fact are so common because the members of the disability community who use a wheelchair

1 for mobility are being denied their civil rights under federal and state laws – that is, each member  
2 of the disability community who use a wheelchair for mobility suffered substantially similar  
3 violations relating to exterior path of travel facilities, entrance facilities, restrooms, interior path of  
4 travel facilities, and display facilities. Further, the claims or defenses of the representative parties  
5 are typical – Plaintiffs have the right to access facilities, establishments, and businesses like those  
6 within the facility in which Defendant THE SCREEN MACHINE is located for many reasons such  
7 as the purchase of retail merchandise. Defendants’ facilities are open to the general public and  
8 Plaintiffs have been denied access because of violations, as outlined above and specifically  
9 addressed elsewhere within this Complaint. Additionally, Plaintiffs, as the named representatives,  
10 will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class because Plaintiffs and the members of  
11 the disability community in the State of California who use a wheelchair for mobility have suffered  
12 substantially similar violations. Finally, a pattern and practice exists on the part of Defendants, and  
13 each of them, of architectural discrimination at their public facilities located within the State of  
14 California. On information and good faith belief, Plaintiffs thereon allege that Defendants, prior to  
15 the passing of the Americans With Disabilities Act in 1992, conceived, commissioned, designed,  
16 and implemented among other things, a design for their public facilities, including, but not limited  
17 to disabled parking facilities, exterior path of travel facilities, restroom, entrance facilities, interior  
18 path of travel facilities, and display facilities, which do not meet the minimal standards outlined  
19 under the federal regulations known as the Americans With Disabilities Act Accessibility  
20 Guidelines (“ADAAG”) and state regulations, also known as Title 24 of the California Building  
21 Code, and to which non-compliant plan they continue to utilize to the injury of the members of the  
22 class. For these reasons and the facts as stated herein, Plaintiffs have the right to maintain this  
23 statewide class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b).

**CONCISE SET OF FACTS**

24  
25  
26 7. In 2006, Plaintiff’s Member went to THE SCREEN MACHINE. As Said Member is  
27 unable to walk Plaintiff’s Member uses a wheelchair. Plaintiff’s Member experienced architectural  
28 barriers at the place at which impeded his access. Plaintiff can prove these barriers as Plaintiff

1 conducted a survey of Defendants' facility and Plaintiff's counsel will provide it to competent  
2 defense counsel. Plaintiff's Members allege its visually and hearing impaired members desire to go  
3 to Defendants' facility but cannot because of lack of auxiliary aids.

4 Plaintiffs specifically allege that Defendants knew, to a substantial certainty, that the architectural  
5 barriers precluded wheelchair access. First, Plaintiffs will prove that Defendants had actual  
6 knowledge that the architectural barriers precluded wheelchair access - that it would be hard to  
7 believe that noncompliance with ADAAG as to accessible entrances could be other than  
8 intentional. Second, due to the abundance of ADA information and constant news covers of ADA  
9 lawsuits, Defendants had actual knowledge of the ADA and decided deliberately not to remove  
10 architectural barriers. Third, Defendants have no plans to remodel. Fourth, it would be hard to  
11 believe that Defendants did not have actual knowledge of ADA given all the ADA public  
12 awareness campaigns, the abundance of free ADA information and the media's constant ADA  
13 coverage. Fifth, a human being acting for the defendants made a conscious decision as to how to  
14 proceed given the presence of the architectural barriers. Plaintiffs allege any alternative methods  
15 preclude integration of wheelchair patrons, as it requires them to use a second-class entrance. Also,  
16 expert testimony will show the facility contained inaccessible features. Plaintiffs allege businesses  
17 often state that they have few customers with disabilities. Plaintiffs allege such customers avoid  
18 patronizing inaccessible business and are deterred from patronizing such businesses. The courts  
19 have recognized deterrence-based damage claims under Civil Code 54.3 and 52. Since California  
20 courts have held that the California disability access laws manifest an intent on the part of the  
21 legislature that they be interpreted in a manner that maximizes incentives for compliance, (see  
22 Donald, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 808-11) the courts conclude that application of this canon of construction  
23 requires that 54.1 and 51, and their respective damages provisions, 54.3 and 52, be interpreted as  
24 extending to claims based on incidents of deterrence. The courts therefore hold that where a  
25 plaintiff can prove that violations of applicable California disability access standards deterred her  
26 on a particular occasion from attempting to attend a place of public accommodation, that plaintiff  
27 states a claim for relief under California Civil Code 54.1 and 51 and, in particular, for damages,  
28

1 under 54.3 and 52. Plaintiffs allege people with disabilities still face systemic discrimination each  
2 and every day. One of the most debilitating forms of discrimination is segregation imposed by  
3 others. Discrimination also includes exclusion, or denial of benefits, services, or other  
4 opportunities that are as effective and meaningful as those provided to others. Discrimination  
5 results from actions or inactions that discriminate by effect as well as by intent or design.  
6 Discrimination also includes harms resulting from the construction of transportation, architectural,  
7 and communication barriers and the adoption or application of standards and criteria and practices  
8 and procedures based on thoughtlessness or indifference-of benign neglect. Discrimination also  
9 includes harms affecting individuals with a history of disability, and those regarded by others as  
10 having a disability as well as persons associated with such individuals that are based on false  
11 presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and  
12 pernicious mythologies. Discrimination also includes the effects a person's disability may have on  
13 others. The ADA aim is: (1) To provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the  
14 elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; [and] (2) to provide clear, strong,  
15 consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.  
16 (42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), (2) (Supp. II 1990)) Plaintiffs allege the legislative history of the Act,  
17 which reflects congressional concerns over the deleterious effects of discrimination against people  
18 with disabilities. As a result, Congress incorporated within Title II of the ADA the remedial  
19 provision in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. (As amended 29 U.S.C. § 794a)(42  
20 U.S.C. § 12133)(See *Smith v. Barton*, 914 F.2d 1330, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.  
21 2825 (1991)) Much has been written recently about the ADA and its mechanisms of enforcement.  
22 (See e.g., *Doran v. Del Taco, Inc.*, --- F.Supp.2d ---- (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2005); *Molski*, 347  
23 F.Supp.2d at 862-63; *Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Restaurant*, 96 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1070-71  
24 (D.Haw.2000)) For purposes of this suit, it is sufficient to note that the statute creates a private  
25 right of action through which a litigant may seek injunctive relief as well as attorneys' fees and  
26 costs. (42 U.S.C. § 2188(a)) Plaintiffs allege that it cannot be said that because an attorney has  
27 chosen to specialize in an area, which provides statutory attorneys fees his practice is necessarily  
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1 suspect. Class actions, antitrust, and consumer protection statutes are just some of the examples  
2 where the legislature has made a determination that society will benefit from private attorneys  
3 general. The ADA is but another example. Plaintiff TRIPPLE AAA ASSOCIATION FOR  
4 CHILDREN WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES is an organization that advocates on the  
5 behalf of children and others with disabilities specifically including adults who use wheelchairs  
6 when their civil rights and liberties have been violated. Plaintiff's Member visited the place in 2006  
7 and plans on returning to the place and he encountered architectural barriers there. Association  
8 standing requires that (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, (2)  
9 the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose and (3)  
10 neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members.  
11 *Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission*, 432 U.S. 333, 343; *Greater Los Angeles*  
12 *Council On Deafness, Inc. v. Baldrige*, 827 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs have  
13 standing to bring this action. Plaintiff Association has at least four members who use wheelchairs  
14 as they cannot walk at all. The purpose of the Association is to fight to remove access and  
15 architectural barriers.

16 8. Plaintiff's Member has a physical impairment and due to this impairment he has learned to  
17 successfully operate a wheelchair. Plaintiff's Member and Plaintiff(s) has physical impairments  
18 because her conditions affect one or more of the following body systems: neurological,  
19 musculoskeletal, special sense organs, and/or cardiovascular. Further, Plaintiff's Member and  
20 Plaintiff(s) said physical impairments substantially limits one or more of the following major life  
21 activities: walking. In addition, Plaintiff's Member and Plaintiff(s) cannot perform one or more of  
22 the said major life activities in the manner, speed, and duration when compared to the average  
23 person. Moreover, Plaintiff's Member and Plaintiff(s) has a history of or has been classified as  
24 having a physical impairment as required by 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

25 9. Plaintiff's Members expressly intend to patronize the establishment and the property that is  
26 the subject of this Complaint in the immediate future.

27 10. When Plaintiff's Member researched Defendants' facilities, he discovered he would be  
28

1 unable to use the public accommodations' at Defendants' business establishments because they  
2 failed to comply with ADA Access Guidelines For Buildings and Facilities (hereafter referred to as  
3 "ADAAG") and/or California's Title 24 Building Code Requirements as specified herein.

4 Defendants failed to remove access barriers within the parking public accommodations of  
5 Defendants' establishment. Plaintiff's Member was deterred from patronizing the facility because  
6 he experienced difficulty using the parking barriers at Defendants' facility.

7 11. The architectural regulations or "design standards" implemented by the federal ADA are  
8 often referred to in the literature as "ADAAGs," which is an acronym for "ADA Architectural  
9 Guidelines." (See *Independent Living I*, 982 F. Supp. at pp. 707-708 ["The guidelines issued by the  
10 Access Board are denominated the 'ADA Accessibility Guidelines' ('ADAAG.'). The design  
11 standards enacted by the Attorney General are identical to the ADAAGs, but are denominated as  
12 'Standards.' Despite the technical distinction, the two terms are often used interchangeably."];  
13 *Access Now, Inc. v. Ambulatory Surgery Center Group, Ltd.* (S.D. Fla. 2001) 146 F. Supp. 2d  
14 1334, 1336 ["These guidelines are called ... ("ADAAG") ... ."].) The "ADAAGs" are found in  
15 Appendix A to Part 36 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The ADAAG violations  
16 alleged here are basically so intuitive that it would be hard to believe that noncompliance with them  
17 could be other than intentional.

18 12. Plaintiff(s) was deterred from patronizing the facility due to the alleged ADA violations  
19 and/or alleged architectural barriers outlined in Paragraphs 10 through 11 above.

20 13. While Plaintiff's Member expressly wants to patronize Defendant's establishment and the  
21 property that is the subject of this Complaint in the immediate future, Plaintiff and Plaintiff's  
22 Member is expressly deterred from returning to the establishment and the property that is the  
23 subject of this Complaint due to the existence of the architectural barriers outlined above in  
24 Paragraphs 10 through 11.

25 14. Pursuant to federal and state law, Defendants are required to remove barriers to their  
26 existing facilities. Further, Defendants had actual knowledge of their barrier removal duties under  
27 the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil Code before January 26, 1992. Also, Defendants  
28

1 should have known that individuals with disabilities are not required to give notice to a  
2 governmental agency before filing suit alleging Defendants failed to remove architectural barriers.

3 15. Plaintiffs believe and herein allege Defendants' facilities have access violations not  
4 directly known by Plaintiff which preclude or limit access by other members of Plaintiff  
5 organization or other persons with disabilities, including but not limited to violations relating to  
6 Space Allowance and Reach Ranges, Accessible Route, Protruding Objects, Ground and Floor  
7 Surfaces, Parking and Passenger Loading Zones, Curb Ramps, Ramps, Stairs, Elevators, Platform  
8 Lifts (Wheelchair Lifts), Windows, Doors, Entrances, Drinking Fountains and Water Coolers,  
9 Water Closets, Toilet Stalls, Urinals, Lavatories and Mirrors, Sinks, Storage, Handrails, Grab Bars,  
10 and Controls and Operating Mechanisms, Alarms, Detectable Warnings, Signage, and Telephones.  
11 Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege Defendants are required to remove all architectural barriers, known or  
12 unknown. Also, Plaintiffs allege Defendants are required to utilize the ADA checklist for Readily  
13 Achievable Barrier Removal approved by the United States Department of Justice and created by  
14 Adaptive Environments.

15 16. Based on these facts, Plaintiffs allege Plaintiff's Member and Plaintiff(s) were  
16 discriminated against each time he patronized Defendants' establishment. Plaintiff's Member was  
17 extremely upset due to Defendants' conduct.

18 **NOTICE**

19 17. Plaintiffs are not required to provide notice to the defendants prior to filing a complaint.  
20 (See *Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty*, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir 2000))  
21

22 **WHAT CLAIMS ARE PLAINTIFFS ALLEGING AGAINST EACH NAMED**  
23 **DEFENDANT**

24 18. THE SCREEN MACHINE, INC.; RONALD L. HALL; and Does 1 through 10 will be  
25 referred to collectively hereinafter as "Defendants."  
26

27 19. Plaintiffs aver that the Defendants are liable for the following claims as alleged below:

28 **DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS**

1 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS- Claims Under The Americans  
2 With Disabilities Act Of 1990

3 Claim I

4 19. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of  
5 disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or  
6 accommodations of any place of public accommodation as Defendants own, lease (or lease to), or  
7 operate a place of public accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. §12182.

8 Claim II

9 20. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs directly, or  
10 through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the  
11 individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges,  
12 advantages, or accommodations of an entity in violation of 42 U.S.C. §12182.

13 Claim III

14 21. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs as it is  
15 discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or  
16 disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other  
17 arrangements with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility,  
18 privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals in  
19 violation of 42 U.S.C. §12182.

20 Claim IV

21 22. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs as it is  
22 discriminatory to provide an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or  
23 disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other  
24 arrangements with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different  
25 or separate from that provided to other individuals.

26 Claim V

27 23. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs as Defendants  
28

1 failed to afforded to an individual with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the  
2 needs of the individual in violation of 42 U.S.C. §12182.

3 Claim VI

4 24. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs as Defendants  
5 utilized standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on  
6 the basis of disability; or that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common  
7 administrative control in violation of 42 U.S.C. §12182.

8 Claim VII

9 25. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs as it is  
10 discriminatory to exclude or otherwise deny equal goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,  
11 accommodations, or other opportunities to an individual or entity because of the known disability  
12 of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association  
13 in violation of 42 U.S.C. §12182. See Niece v. Fitzner 922 F. Supp. 1208 (1996)

14 Claim VIII

15 26. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs as Defendants  
16 engaged in the following specific prohibitions: (i) the imposition or application of eligibility criteria  
17 that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with  
18 disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or  
19 accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods,  
20 services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered; (ii) a failure to make  
21 reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are  
22 necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to  
23 individuals with disabilities;

24 27. (iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a  
25 disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other  
26 individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services; (iv) a failure to remove  
27 architectural barriers, and communication barriers that are structural in nature, in existing facilities  
28

1 in violation of 42 U.S.C. §12182.

2 Claim IX

3 28. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs as Defendant  
4 failed to demonstrate that the removal of a barrier is not readily achievable, and made such goods,  
5 services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative  
6 methods in a segregated manner in violation of 42 U.S.C. §12182.

7 Claim X

8 29. Based on the facts stated above, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs as Defendants  
9 altered the use of their establishment in a manner that affected or could have affected the usability  
10 of the facility or part thereof and failed to make alterations in such a manner that, to the maximum  
11 extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by individuals  
12 with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs in violation of 42 U.S.C. §12183.

13 30. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment and relief as hereinafter set forth.

14  
15 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS - CLAIMS UNDER**  
16 **CALIFORNIA ACCESSIBILITY LAWS**

17 **CLAIM I: Denial Of Full And Equal Access**

18 31. Based on the facts plead at ¶¶ 6-16 above and elsewhere in this complaint, Plaintiff's  
19 Member and Plaintiff(s) was denied full and equal access to Defendants' goods, services, facilities,  
20 privileges, advantages, or accommodations within a public accommodation owned, leased, and/or  
21 operated by Defendants as required by Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1. Defendants' facility  
22 violated California's Title 24 Accessible Building Code by failing to provide access to Defendants'  
23 facilities due to violations pertaining to the Space Allowance and Reach Ranges, Accessible Route,  
24 Protruding Objects, Ground and Floor Surfaces, Parking and Passenger Loading Zones, Curb  
25 Ramps, Ramps, Stairs, Elevators, Platform Lifts (Wheelchair Lifts), Windows, Doors, Entrances,  
26 Drinking Fountains and Water Coolers, Water Closets, Toilet Stalls, Urinals, Lavatories and  
27 Mirrors, Sinks, Storage, Handrails, Grab Bars, and Controls and Operating Mechanisms, Alarms,  
28 Detectable Warnings, Signage, and Telephones. These violations denied Plaintiff's Member and

1 Plaintiff(s) full and equal access to Defendants' facility. Thus, Plaintiff's Member and Plaintiff(s)  
2 was subjected to discrimination pursuant to Civil Code §§ 51, 52, and 54.1 because Plaintiff's  
3 Member and Plaintiff(s) was denied full, equal and safe access to Defendants' facility, causing  
4 severe emotional distress. The Disabled Persons Act is found in *sections 54* of the Civil Code, and  
5 has been around in some form on the statute books since the late 1960's--more than 20 years before  
6 the federal ADA. (See Stats. 1968, ch. 461.) The Disabled Persons Act begins with the statement in  
7 *subdivision (a) of section 54* that "Individuals with disabilities or medical conditions have the same  
8 right as the general public to the full and free use of ... public facilities, and other public places." (*β*  
9 *54, subd. (a).*) *Section 54* is immediately followed by *section 54.1, subdivision (a)(3)* of which--in  
10 contrast to the more spartan reference to the ADA in *section 51*--specifically incorporates ADA  
11 *regulations*. The enforcement of *section 54* is to be found in *section 54.3. Subdivision (a)(3) of*  
12 *section 54.1* provides: " 'Full and equal access,' for purposes of this section in its application to  
13 transportation, means access that meets the standards of Titles II and III of the Americans with  
14 Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) and federal regulations adopted pursuant thereto,  
15 except that, if the laws of this state prescribe higher standards, it shall mean access that meets those  
16 higher standards." *Subdivision (a) of section 54.3* provides in its entirety: "Any person or persons,  
17 firm or corporation who denies or interferes with admittance to or enjoyment of the public facilities  
18 as specified in *Sections 54* and *54.1* or otherwise interferes with the rights of an individual with a  
19 disability under *Section 54, 54.1,* and *54.2* is liable for each offense for the actual damages and any  
20 amount as may be determined by a jury, or the court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of  
21 three times the amount of actual damages but in no case less than one thousand dollars (\$ 1,000),  
22 and attorney's fees as may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person  
23 denied any of the rights provided in *Sections 54, 54.1,* and *54.2*. 'Interfere' for purposes of this  
24 section, includes, but is not limited to, preventing or causing the prevention of a guide dog, signal  
25 dog, or service dog from carrying out its functions in assisting a disabled person." *Section 54.3* was  
26 construed in the 1990 *Cafe Royale* decision as providing for strict liability--that is, liability without  
27 any need for intentional conduct--prior to the 1992 legislation which added both *subdivision (f) to*  
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1 section 51 and subdivision (c) of section 54 (back then in the context of the minimum penalty under  
2 section 54.3 which was \$ 250; now it is \$ 1,000). *Cafe Royale* was a case decided prior to the  
3 enactment of the ADA, and contains not a word about federal law. It was also decided exclusively  
4 under *Civil Code section 54 et seq.*, and contains not one word on the Unruh Act. In *Cafe Royale*,  
5 a wheelchair user (a former deputy Attorney General and member of the Attorney General's task  
6 force on disability) discovered that he could not reach the main dining area of a tiered restaurant on  
7 his own, though the restaurant offered to lift him up the stairs. He declined an offer of help because  
8 it would attract attention and because he might be dropped in the process of being bodily picked up  
9 and moved. He sued the restaurant under *section 54.3* because of the absence of ramps or elevators  
10 to the second-tiered area. The restaurant thought that it had complied with the law because its  
11 architect thought, based on an informal conversation with an employee of the San Francisco  
12 building department, that a certain number of handicapped seating places was "all that was needed  
13 for compliance." (See *id. at p. 174.*) The building department employee, however, gave the  
14 restaurant architect erroneous advice. In fact, the State Building Standards Code (required by  
15 *Government Code section 4450 et seq*) provided that all floors of a restaurant be on a common level  
16 or else accessible by either ramps or elevators. While a hardship exemption might be obtained, 75  
17 percent of the main dining area would still need to be handicap accessible, and the *Cafe Royale's*  
18 option of seating wheelchair patrons in the bar or having them carried to the common area was a  
19 violation. On appeal, the fact of the violation was understood by all parties: "All parties agreed that  
20 *Cafe Royale's* seating capacity was in violation of the handicap access requirements." (*Cafe Royale*,  
21 *supra*, 218 Cal. App. 3d at p. 174.) Hence issue was joined as to whether the restaurant's "good  
22 faith" belief that it was "in compliance" (*ibid.*) was sufficient to deny the patron recovery under  
23 *section 54.3*. The trial court thought so, but the appellate court disagreed. The appellate court  
24 reasoned thusly: the fact that *section 54.3* said a person who "denies or interferes with admittance  
25 to or enjoyment of the public facilities as specified in *section 54* and *54.1* ... is liable for each  
26 offense ... but in no case less than two hundred fifty dollars (\$ 250) ... ." The court said: "The plain  
27 meaning of this language is that ordinarily minimum statutory damages in the amount of \$ 250  
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1 must be awarded for a denial of equal access in violation of *section 54 et seq., notwithstanding the*  
2 *defendant's intent.*" (*Id. at p. 177.*) The *Cafe Royale* court reasoned that an interpretation of *section*  
3 *54.3* that included an element of intentional violation would, because the level of compliance  
4 would diminish, yield "a result that is clearly repugnant to the statutory purpose." Further, the  
5 Donald case held a Plaintiff need not visit the facility to sue for compliance. (*Id. at pp. 179-180.*) So  
6 the trial court reversed the trial court judgment awarding the plaintiff nothing, and concluded that  
7 he was entitled to the \$ 250 statutory minimum. (See *id. at pp. 180-181.*) Café Royale applies here.  
8 Thus, Defendants' good faith efforts, if any, are irrelevant as is any reliance on a city building  
9 inspector.

10 **CLAIM II: Failure To Modify Practices, Policies And Procedures**

11 32. Based on the facts plead at ¶¶ 6-16 above and elsewhere herein this complaint, Defendants  
12 failed and refused to provide a reasonable alternative by modifying its practices, policies, and  
13 procedures in that they failed to have a scheme, plan, or design to assist Plaintiffs and/or others  
14 similarly situated in entering and utilizing Defendants' services as required by Civil Code § 54.1.  
15 Thus, Plaintiff's Member and Plaintiff(s) were subjected to discrimination in violation of Civil  
16 Code § 54.1.

17 **CLAIM III: Violation Of The Unruh Act**

18 33. Based on the facts plead at ¶¶ 6-16 above and elsewhere herein this complaint and because  
19 Defendants violated the Civil Code § 51 by failing to comply with 42 United States Code §  
20 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) and 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2), Defendants did and continue to knowingly  
21 discriminate against Plaintiffs and persons similarly situated in violation of Civil Code §§ 51, 52,  
22 and 54.1. Plaintiffs allege the access violations alleged here are so obvious as to implicate at least a  
23 prima facie case of discriminatory intent.

24 34. Based on the facts plead at ¶¶ 6-16 above, Claims I, II, and III of Plaintiffs' Second Cause  
25 Of Action above, and the facts elsewhere herein this complaint, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable  
26 harm unless Defendants are ordered to remove architectural, non-architectural, and communication  
27 barriers at Defendants' public accommodation. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' discriminatory  
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conduct is capable of repetition, and this discriminatory repetition adversely impacts Plaintiffs and a substantial segment of the disability community. Plaintiffs allege there is a state and national public interest in requiring accessibility in places of public accommodation. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to redress the discriminatory conduct of Defendants. Plaintiffs desire to return to Defendants' places of business in the immediate future. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs allege that a structural or mandatory injunction is necessary to enjoin compliance with state civil rights laws enacted for the benefit of individuals with disabilities.

35. Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray for damages and relief as hereinafter stated.

**DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT FOR RELIEF:**

A. For injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a). Plaintiffs request this Court enjoin Defendants to remove all architectural barriers in, at, or on their facilities related to the following: Space Allowance and Reach Ranges, Accessible Route, Protruding Objects, Ground and Floor Surfaces, Parking and Passenger Loading Zones, Curb Ramps, Ramps, Stairs, Elevators, Platform Lifts (Wheelchair Lifts), Windows, Doors, Entrances, Drinking Fountains and Water Coolers, Water Closets, Toilet Stalls, Urinals, Lavatories and Mirrors, Sinks, Storage, Handrails, Grab Bars, and Controls and Operating Mechanisms, Alarms, Detectable Warnings, Signage, and Telephones.

B. For damages pursuant to Cal. Civil Code § 52 or 54.3

C. For attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, and Cal. Civil Code § 51, 52; 54.3;

D. A Jury Trial and;

E. For such other further relief as the court deems proper.

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Respectfully submitted:

**PINNOCK & WAKEFIELD, A.P.C.**

Dated: 11-22-06

By: 

THEODORE A. PINNOCK, ESQ.  
MICHELLE L. WAKEFIELD, ESQ.  
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SECOND PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I (a) PLAINTIFFS TRIPPLE AAA ASSOCIATION FOR CHILDREN WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES

DEFENDANTS THE SCREEN MACHINE, INC.; RONALD L. HALL; and does 1 through 10, Inclusive, Defendants

FILED 2006 NOV 22 AM 10:23

(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF San Diego, CA (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDANT San Diego, CA (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED

(c) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER) Theodore A. Pinnock, Esq. SBN 153434 Michelle L. Wakefield, Esq. SBN 200424 David C. Wakefield, Esq. SBN:185736 Pinnock & Wakefield; 3033 Fifth Avenue, Suite 410 San Diego, California 92103 Telephone: (619) 858-3671; Facsimile: (619) 858-3646

ATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN)

06CV 2588 DMS CAB

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (PLACE AN X IN ONE BOX ONLY)

- 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff
3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
2 U.S. Government Defendant
4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (PLACE AN X IN ONE BOX FOR PLAINTIFF AND ONE BOX FOR DEFENDANT (For Diversity Cases Only))

- Citizen of This State
Citizen of Another State
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country
PT DEF DEF
1 Incorporated or Principal Place of Business in This State
2 Incorporated and Principal Place of Business in Another State
3 Foreign Nation
4
5
6

IV. CAUSE OF ACTION (CITE THE US CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE. DO NOT CITE JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY).

42 U.S.C. Sections 12101-12102, 12181-12183, and 12201, Et. Seq.

V. NATURE OF SUIT (PLACE AN X IN ONE BOX ONLY)

Table with columns: CONTRACT, REAL PROPERTY, TORTS, CIVIL RIGHTS, PRISONER PETITIONS, FORFEITURE/PENALTY, LABOR, BANKRUPTCY, SOCIAL SECURITY, FEDERAL TAX SUITS, OTHER STATUTES. Includes various legal categories and checkboxes.

VI. ORIGIN (PLACE AN X IN ONE BOX ONLY)

- 1 Original Proceeding
2 Removal from State Court
3 Remanded from Appellate Court
4 Reinstated or Reopened
5 Transferred from another district (specify)
6 Multidistrict Litigation
7 Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Judgment

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER f.r.c.p. 23

DEMAND \$

TO BE DETERMINED AT TRIAL

Check YES only if demanded in complaint:

JURY DEMAND: YES NO

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY (See Instructions): JUDGE

Docket Number

DATE November 22, 2006

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

Handwritten signature and notes: 132038 su 11/22/06 \$350

UNITED STATES  
DISTRICT COURT  
Southern District of California  
San Diego Division

# 132038 - A1  
November 22, 2006

Code	Case #	Qty	Amount
CV006900	3-06-CV-2588		60.00 CC
	Judge - SABRAW		
CV006400			100.00 CC
CV510000			190.00 CC
Total->			350.00

FROM: CIVIL FILING AAA ASSOC. FOR  
CHILDREN W/ DISABILITIES ET AL  
V. THE SCREEN MACHINE INC ETAL  
VISA AUTH# 010005 SH